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THE SEARCH FOR POLITICAL AUTHORITY 
IN MASSACHUSETTS' TOXIC WASTE 
MANAGEMENT LAW 
Mary R. English* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the environmental movement of the 1980s, hazardous chemical 
wastes and radioactive wastes have taken center stage. Yet man-
agement of these wastes has been problematic, partly because of 
public reactions. Many people distrust toxic waste facility siting 
processes and withhold consent to their outcomes. As a result, siting 
is often delayed or completely blocked. 
This paper examines how two toxic waste management laws in 
Massachusetts-the 1980 Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Act and 
the 1987 Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Act-differ 
radically in the means by which each seeks to win the public's trust 
and consent. As a prelude to this analysis, key points in the Acts 
are laid out. The analysis itself uses a theory of culture and risk 
management to explore the two Acts' searches for political authority. 
Only when legal authority is accompanied with political authority 
can acts such as these succeed. And given recent federal mandates 
for states to take responsibility for their toxic wastes,l success is 
now an imperative rather than an option. 
* Associate Director, Energy, Environment, and Resources Center, University of Tennes-
see, Knoxville; B.A., 1966, Brown University; M.S., 1973, University of Massachusetts. 
Preparation of this paper was supported by the Waste Management Research and Education 
Institute, a state-sponsored "center of excellence" at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville. 
The author gratefully acknowledges information supplied by Janis Stelluto, Executive Director 
of NELRAD, and by a number of people in the Massachusetts state government. An earlier 
draft received the benefit of a review by Steve Rayner. All errors of fact or interpretation 
are the author's own. 
1 See Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 § 104(k), 42 U.S.C. § 9604 
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986); Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980,42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-
2021j (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). These federal mandates are discussed in the text below. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
The 1980 Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Act2 was 
a bold departure from past approaches to siting locally unwanted 
but publicly necessary facilities. The Act was heralded as a deft 
combination of preemption and negotiation, and several states used 
it as a model for their own hazardous waste management laws. 3 But 
by 1985, both practitioners and academicians were citing the Act, 
commonly referred to as Chapter 21D, as an example of what not to 
do. 4 
Particularly interesting are the comments of a legislative commis-
sion established to determine how Massachusetts should manage its 
low-level radioactive wastes-wastes that, like toxic chemical 
wastes, provoke intense "not in my backyard" (NIMBY) sentiments. 
This commission noted that "serious flaws in both the language of 
Chapter 21D and its implementation have contributed to this state's 
inability to make significant progress toward siting a hazardous 
waste facility."5 
What caused the NIMBY reaction to Chapter 21D, and how have 
the framers of the Massachusetts Low-Level Radioactive Waste 
Management Act6 tried to avoid a similar reaction? 
A. The Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Act 
The Massachusetts Legislature adopted Chapter 21D after various 
developers had failed to site disposal or recycling facilities, largely 
because of local opposition.7 As passed, the Act has three key ele-
ments. 
First, Chapter 21D establishes a state Hazardous Waste Facility 
Site Safety Council to make preliminary determinations of whether 
proposed projects are "feasible and deserving of state assistance."8 
2 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 21D (1986). 
3 Variations of the Massachusetts Chapter 21D model were adopted by other states. See, 
e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-114 to -133 (1985 & Supp. 1988); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 144.445 (1974 & Supp. June 1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS. §§ 23-19.7-1 to -19.7-15 (1985); VA. 
CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-1433 to -1449 (Supp. 1988). 
4 See, e.g., Kasperson, Hazardous Waste Facility Siting: Community, Firm, and Govern-
mental Perspectives, in HAZARDS: TECHNOLOGY AND FAIRNESS 118 (1986). 
5 MASSACHUSETTS SPECIAL LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION ON Low-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE 
WASTE, Low-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT: A SITING PROCESS FOR MASSA-
CHUSETTS, at 5 (1986) [hereinafter Low-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE]. 
6 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111H (West Supp. 1988). 
7 For a discussion of the events and conceptual work that led to ch. 21D, see generally M. 
O'HARE, L. BACOW, & D. SANDERSON, FACILITY SITING AND PUBLIC OPPOSITION (1983). 
8 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 21D, § 7. 
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The Council works with two state agencies: the Department of En-
vironmental Management (DEM), which assesses the State's need 
for hazardous waste facilities, and the Department of Environmental 
Quality Engineering (DEQE), which licenses and regulates such 
facilities. 
Second, Chapter 21D gives a developer the right to construct a 
hazardous waste facility on land zoned for industry if the developer 
passes the "feasible and deserving" test, obtains the required state 
and local permits, and negotiates an agreement with the host com-
munity.9 Communities may not impose new permit requirements 
after Chapter 21D's effective date. 
Third, Chapter 21D directs the community and the developer to 
negotiate an agreement on the facility's design and operation and on 
community compensation and impact mitigation.1O The Council pro-
vides technical assistance grants to the community to aid its nego-
tiations. Binding arbitration may be used to break deadlocks. 
By 1986, five projects had been attempted under Chapter 21D, 
but none had even made it to the negotiating table. Community 
protests and lawsuits had, in short order, blocked all of the proposals. 
In particular, communities sought to get the Council's affirmative 
"feasible and deserving" determinations reversed. 11 While these ef-
forts did not always succeed in themselves, they succeeded in their 
underlying intent to deter the developers. Faced with intense local 
hostility and the prospect of long delays in court, each developer 
withdrew. 
The Massachusetts experience is not unique; nationally, at least 
fifty percent of the proposals made under state hazardous waste 
facility siting programs have failed. 12 Throughout the United States, 
these facilities are perceived as threats to a community's physical 
and economic health. And these perceptions are understandable, 
given well-publicized disasters with hazardous materials and waste, 
such as those at Love Canal and Times Beach, and the prevalent 
image of hazardous waste facilities as "dumps." 
Thus, the Massachusetts approach cannot be rejected out of hand. 
Perhaps no other approach would have been successful, especially 
" See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 40A, § 9 (1986 & Supp. 1987). 
10 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 21D, § 12. 
II For a discussion of some of the early cases under ch. 21D, see M. O'HARE, L. BACOW & 
D. SANDERSON, supra note 7. 
12 See generally A. Ryan, Approaches to Hazardous Waste Facility Siting in the United 
States (September 1984) (a report to the Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Facility Site Safety 
Council). 
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in a politically contentious climate such as Massachusetts'. It is use-
ful, nevertheless, to consider what hasn't worked with the Massa-
chusetts model. 
A number of difficulties attended Chapter 21D's inception. 13 First 
of all, there was a lack of precedent because of the Act's innovative 
approach. Second, facility applications began to come in before rules 
could be promulgated. 14 And third, the inexperience of all parties 
with this kind of negotiation contributed to a failure to begin talking 
before positions had hardened. But two problems in particular have 
continued to plague Chapter 21D: a profound objection by proposed 
host communities to being identified as targets for hazardous waste 
facilities, seemingly without a sufficient rationale; and an even more 
profound objection to the Council's early determination of a proposed 
project's "feasible and deserving" status-again, seemingly without 
a sufficient rationale. 15 
To correct these problems, government, industry, and public in-
terest groups have proposed extensive revisions to Chapter 21D. 
Among the first, and indicative of the thrust of the others, are the 
amendments proposed by Senator Carol Amick in 1986 and subse-
quently resubmitted. 16 These amendments attempt to rectify Chap-
ter 21D's problems in several ways. 
13 The problems in implementing Chapter 21D have been discussed extensively. See, e.g., 
G. McGregor, A Formula for Hazardous Waste Facility Siting (October 1983) (available from 
McGregor & Associates, Boston); Position Paper on the Hazardous Waste Facility Siting 
Process (Nov. 9, 1984) (unpublished paper presented to the Hazardous Waste Facility Site 
Safety Council by the Council's Negotiations Subcommittee); minutes of meetings of the 
Special Legislative Commission on Low-Level Radioactive Waste (November 26 and Decem-
ber 3, 10, & 17, 1984) (testimony taken on the experience under Chapter 21D); Preamble to 
MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 990, §§ 1.00-16.00 (preamble presented by the Hazardous Waste 
Facility Site Safety Council and the Department of Environmental Management, Feb. 1984). 
14 During 1981, Notices of Intent had to be filed for facilities to be located in Haverhill and 
Warren. The regulations for Chapter 21D were, however, promulgated on April 29, 1982. See 
MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 990, §§ 1.00-16.00 (1986). 
15 The meaning of "feasible and deserving" has been one of the greatest sources of contention 
and confusion in Chapter 21D's implementation. As the preamble to the Chapter 21D regu-
lations promulgated April 29, 1982 notes: 
For some, this determination was the equivalent of a licensing deeision on the merits 
of the project itself, requiring the application of rigorous and exhaustive technical 
criteria, extensive deliberation and the full panoply of procedural guarantees. For 
others, the feasible and deserving determination called for by G.L. c.21D was at 
most a rough cut, intended only to identify those proposals so clearly unacceptable 
that they warrant summary dismissal and no further expenditure of state and local 
resources. 
Preamble to MASS. REGS. CODE, tit. 990, §§ 1.00-16.00 (preamble presented by the Hazardous 
Waste Facility Site Safety Council and the Department of Environmental Management, Feb. 
1984). Generally, the prospective host communities took the former view whereas the state 
took the latter view. 
16 S. 1073, 1986 Leg. Sess.; S. 983, 1987 Leg. Sess.; S. 925, 1988 Leg. Sess. A staff member 
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Most importantly, the amendments add statewide hazardous waste 
management planning to the Council's responsibilities. In addition, 
they define the standards to be used by the Council in judging 
facilities, and they postpone and make less seemingly final the Coun-
cil's "feasible and deserving" determination. Finally, they improve 
the potential host community's negotiating position (i) by giving the 
community more money initially in technical assistance grants and 
more time to negotiate before binding arbitration is initiated; (ii) by 
recommending a scale for the developer's direct incentive payments 
to the community; (iii) by providing that host communities may also 
apply to the state for compensatory grants; and (iv) by guaranteeing 
the community access to the facility for environmental monitoring 
purposes.17 
Senator Amick's bill reflected the thinking of the special commis-
sion that she had co-chaired, with Representative Steven Angelo, 
to assess how low-level radioactive wastes should be managed. 18 
Subsequently, Governor Michael Dukakis proposed an even more 
radical revision of Chapter 21D. His April 1988 bill specified that 
the state government should take the lead role in identifying the 
number, size, and types of hazardous waste facilities in Massachu-
setts and potentially suitable areas in which they might be located. 
The Dukakis bill thus paralleled even more closely the recently 
enacted Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Act. 19 
B. The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Act 
In 1980, Congress enacted the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Pol-
icy Act, which requires that each state take responsibility for the 
disposal of low-level radioactive waste (LLW) generated within its 
borders.20 In response to this legislation, Massachusetts passed an 
in Senator Amick's office has indicated that others, including an association of industries, have 
also proposed modifications in Chapter 21D. All call for a stronger state role. Telephone 
interviews with Carol Greenleaf, Chief Legislative Aide to Sen. Amick (Nov. 16, 1987 and 
Apr. 29, 1988). 
17 S. 1073, 1986 Leg. Sess.; S. 983, 1987 Leg. Sess.; S. 925, 1988 Leg. Sess. 
18 See infra Section lIB for a discussion of the special commission's work. 
19 Telephone interview with Thomas McShane, Massachusetts Assistant Secretary of En-
vironmental Affairs (Apr. 29, 1988). 
20 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021j (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). For a discussion of this act and its 
implementation see Colglazier & English, Low-Level Radioactive Waste: Can New Disposal 
Sites Be Found?, 53 TENN. L. REV. 621, 622-25 (1986). For a revised and expanded version 
of this article, see Colglazier & English, Low-Level Radioactive Waste: Can New Disposal 
Sites Be Found?, Low-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE REGULATION-SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND 
FEAR (M. Burns ed. 1988). 
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act in 1981 establishing a special commission to study LLW issues. 21 
The Amick! Angelo commission became staffed and operational in 
1983. Over the next two years, it analyzed Massachusetts' current 
and projected LLW disposal needs and studied possible legislative 
approaches to siting a facility within the state. By 1985, it had 
prepared a draft bill for a Low-Level Radioactive Waste Manage-
ment Act. 22 After circulation for public comment and a series of 
public hearings, a final draft was submitted to the Legislature in 
1986. The Legislature passed it with few changes, and Governor 
Dukakis signed it into law on December 8, 1987.23 
The Act has four crucial features. First, it establishes a board 
with central responsibility for the state's LLW management. 24 Sec-
ond, it specifies a six-phase management process, including planning 
and rule promulgation, site selection, operator and technology selec-
tion, facility approval, facility operation and closure, and post-closure 
institutional control. 25 Third, it provides that, following a preliminary 
screening process and the selection and detailed characterization of 
several candidate sites, the board shall choose a facility site by a 
two-thirds vote. 26 And fourth, it allows the host community to select 
the facility operator and disposal technology and to negotiate an 
impact mitigation and compensation agreement. 27 
In designing the Act, the commission noted that it sought "a 
workable process that [would] not repeat the mistakes of Chapter 
21D."28 In particular, the commission attempted to distinguish its 
proposed process from that of Chapter 21D by (i) instituting a pro-
21 1981 Mass. Acts 738. The 20-member commission included three state senators, five state 
representatives, the Secretary of Environmental Affairs, the Commissioner of Public Health, 
five representatives of municipal, conservation, industrial, academic, and utility organizations, 
and five representatives of the public appointed by the Governor. 
22 See generally Low-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE, supra note 5. 
2:! The Act was enacted, but not without controversy. In the course of the nearly two years 
between the originally proposed H.R. 5000 0986 legislative session) and H.R. 5830 as enacted, 
the bill followed a rocky road, partly because of the debate over whether the "Chapter 503 
test" should be included. See infra note 35. The federal Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy 
Amendments Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-240) extended the 1980 Low-Level Radioactive Waste 
Policy Act's disposal facility deadline from 1986 to 1993 and established interim milestones to 
ensure that the new deadline would be met. It is doubtful whether, without the financial and 
disposal access penalties imposed in the event of failure to meet the January 1, 1988 milestone, 
the Massachusetts Legislature would have found the political will to reconcile its differences 
and enact H.R. 5830. 
24 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111H, ~~ 2-4 (West Supp. 1988). 
25Id. §§ 10-48. 
26Id. § 23. 
27Id. §§ 27, 33. 
2" Low-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE, supra note 5, at 5. 
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cess that, through detailed planning and screening and extensive 
public involvement, would establish credibility before any decisions 
were made; and (ii) allowing the local community to determine who 
would operate the facility and what the facility's technology would 
be. 
III. ANALYSIS 
These two Acts, and others like them, make silent but fervent 
appeals to the principles of trust and consent held by their consti-
tuencies. For without constituency support, those responsible for 
carrying out the Acts' mandates lack political authority, and their 
chances of success are dim. 
A. Implied Principles of Trust and Consent 
Although principles of trust and consent usually go unstated, they 
can be elucidated with the help of a theory of culture and risk 
management developed by Steve Rayner with his colleague, Robin 
Cantor.29 Briefly stated, Rayner and Cantor's theory adopts the 
concept that social organizations can be grouped into three Weberian 
ideal types,30 with a fourth, residual category for individuals who 
are isolated from decisionmaking institutions. Their theory goes on 
to suggest that each type will have distinct cultural biases toward, 
among other things, issues of trust and consent. 31 These types in-
clude: 
(1) The competitive-market type. Members of this type tend to trust 
successful individuals rather than organizations. They assume that 
"" This theory was first introduced by Steve Rayner at the 1984 meeting of the Society for 
Risk Analysis. See Rayner, Learning from the Blind Man and the Elephant, or Seeing Things 
Whole in Risk Management (Society for Risk Analysis Annual Meeting, Knoxville, Tennessee, 
1984), reprinted in UNCERTAINTY IN RISK ASSESSMENT, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND DECISION 
MAKING (V. Covello, L. Lave, A. Moghissi & V. Uppuluri eds. 1987). For a current version 
of the theory, see Rayner & Cantor, How Fair is Safe Enough? The Cultural Approach to 
Societal Technology Choice, RISK ANALYSIS, vol. 7, no. 1, 1987, at 3 (published by the Society 
for Risk Analysis). For background, see also Rayner, Disagreeing About Risk: The Institu-
tional Cultures of Risk Management and Planning for Future Generations, RISK ANALYSIS, 
INSTITUTIONS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (S. Hadden ed. 1984). 
"0 See generally M. WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (A.M. 
Henderson & T. Parsons trans. 1947). 
:11 Steve Rayner has noted his intellectual indebtedness to others, particularly Mary Douglas 
for her work on cultural perceptions of risk and Douglas MacLean for his work on risk and 
consent. Telephone interview with Steve Rayner (November 16, 1987). See, e.g., M. DOUGLAS 
& A. WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE (1982); VALUES AT RISK (D. MacLean ed. 1986). 
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consent can be given implicitly, by preferences that are not stated 
expressly but are revealed through market decisions. 
(2) The bureaucratic-hierarchical type. Members of this type tend 
to trust routine procedures and well-established organizations. They 
regard consent as something that can be assumed to have been given 
hypothetically, as part of a social contract between the citizen and 
the decisionmaking institution. 
(3) The egalitarian type. Members of this type distrust both the 
market and the bureaucratic approaches. Instead, they tend to trust 
decisionmaking by consensus and to require explicit consent. 
(4) The atomized-individual type. Members of this residual category 
include those who are controlled by the system but who have little 
say in it and are simply struggling for survival. They tend to trust 
the forces of luck, God, or nature and have no special consent prin-
ciples. 
U sing this theory as an analytical tool, it becomes clear that an 
effort to serve two masters dominated the design of Chapter 21D. 
On the one hand, there was the market type (the developers); on 
the other, the egalitarian type (the host communities). The bureau-
cratic type (the Site Safety Council) was simply to mediate between 
the two. As one on-the-scene lawyer commented, "[t]he idea of the 
[Act] was ... [to] create a win-win situation for all parties. Com-
panies would enjoy a streamlined approval process. Communities 
would be willing hosts. Citizens would appreciate negotiated bene-
fits. Thus, the public would get needed storage, treatment, and 
disposal capacity to serve Massachusetts business. ":\2 
Obviously, Chapter 21D's strategy for success didn't work. In-
stead, as this lawyer went on to note,33 Chapter 21D disappointed 
practically everyone: businesses, cities and towns, and the public 
interest groups. Local officials criticized the siting process as not 
fair, and local citizens became distrustful and galvanized in opposition 
to proposed facilities. Meanwhile, waste management companies de-
spaired of ever getting their facilities approved. 
The Chapter 21D amendments proposed by Governor Dukakis, 
Senator Amick, and others34 have sought to turn failure into success 
by redirecting the Act's appeals to underlying principles of trust and 
consent. By legitimizing and routinizing Chapter 21D's institutional 
procedures, its appeals to principles held by the bureaucratic type 
32 McGregor, supra note 13, at l. 
~3 [d. at 3. 
34 See supra Section IIA for a discussion of these amendments. 
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would be strengthened. However, by taking some of the pressure 
to negotiate off the prospective host community and by giving 
greater local control over some key issues, its appeals to egalitarian 
principles would also be reinforced. This redirection switches Chap-
ter 21D's emphasis from a market/egalitarian approach with a rela-
tively weak bureaucratic role to a bureaucratic/egalitarian approach 
with a relatively weak market role. 
The proposed amendments to Chapter 21D thus seek to emulate 
the characteristics of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management 
Act. The latter Act, with its elaborate institutional procedures, em-
phasizes the development of trust in the government's LLW man-
agement process. This trust enables, at key points in the process, 
the assumption of a tacit consent to decisions that are to be made at 
the state level. The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Act 
therefore makes a strong appeal to the principles held by the bu-
reaucratic type. However, by providing for extensive public involve-
ment in the process leading up to these centralized decisions and by 
allowing some important decisions to be made by the host commu-
nity, it also makes a strong appeal to egalitarian principles. 35 
A not-too-hidden agenda lies behind Chapter 21D and the Low-
Level Radioactive Waste Management Act. In each instance, the 
Act's framers are groping for the best way to ensure implementation. 
:15 See supra note 23 for a discussion of the legislative history of the Low-Level Radioactive 
Waste Management Act. A key issue was whether the "Chapter 503 test" should be included 
in the Act. Nuclear Power and Waste Disposal Voter Approval and Legislative Certification 
Act, 1982 Mass. Acts 503 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164 App., §§ 3-1 to -9 (West 
Supp. 1988)). Chapter 503 requires that no nuclear waste storage or disposal facilities can be 
constructed or operated in Massachusetts, and no interstate compact for nuclear waste storage 
or disposal can be entered into by the state, unless approval is given by majority vote in a 
statewide referendum and in both houses of the Legislature. See generally id. The originally 
proposed H.R. 5000 was extremely detailed but was silent on the Chapter 503 requirement. 
A Senate version of the bill (S. 1716, 1986 Leg. Sess.) was proposed with the Chapter 503 
requirement explicitly included-partly in order to test its constitutionality. The Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court found the voter approval process stipulated by Chapter 503 to 
be unconstitutional under the Massachusetts Constitution, on the grounds that the Legislature 
is prohibited from referring any act or resolve taken on its own initiative to the voters for 
their rejection or approval. Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 397 Mass. 1201 (1986). The 
court also found unconstitutional the inclusion of the Chapter 503 test in the proposed Low-
Level Radioactive Waste Management Act, because it encroaches on the power of the exec-
utive branch in violation of separation of powers principles set forth in the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights. Id. at 1208-10. For a discussion of the events leading up to the court's 
opinion, see Colglazier & English, supra note 20. Although the constitutionality of the Chapter 
503 test is now in doubt, it continues to be attractive to a number of people-partly because 
it appeals to their egalitarian principles. Chapter 503 does not necessarily weaken the Low-
Level Radioactive Waste Management Act's appeal to bureaucratic-hierarchical principles, 
but it could derail the waste facility siting process if those appeals are not successful. 
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And implementation is only possible if the Act is backed by political 
authority. 
B. The Search for Political Authority 
What counts as political authority? Endless debate surrounds this 
question, but two characteristics are generally recognized as essen-
tial to political authority. First, political authority is a codified or 
routinized form of power. And second, political authority requires 
some form of voluntary submission or consent. 
The discussion that follows requires two other important distinc-
tions about political authority.36 On the one hand, authority can be 
mistaken for external coercion, because both demand obedience. 
Authority is not external coercion, however. Instead, where external 
coercion is used, authority has failed. On the other hand, authority 
is not mere persuasion. Whereas persuasion presupposes equality, 
authority is hierarchical. And whereas persuasion works through 
argument, argument means that authority has been left in abeyance. 
Authority, then, is neither coercion by force nor persuasion by ar-
gument. Instead, authority relies on a shared sense of the rightness 
and legitimacy of the hierarchy itself, within which both the one who 
commands and the one who obeys have their own predetermined 
and stable places. 37 
Many social philosophers contend that, for better or for worse, 
political authority has vanished from the modern world. 38 To the 
extent that they are right, the demise of political authority bodes ill 
for hierarchical structures, which traditionally have relied on this 
authority to hold themselves intact and carry out their functions. 
Put another way, bureaucratic groups can no longer take for granted 
public recognition of their legitimacy and the consent of their con-
stituents. This has important ramifications for the three organiza-
tional types discussed above. To understand these ramifications, one 
must first understand the inter-group dynamics of the three types. 
The bureaucratic-hierarchical type, especially as it is represented 
by public institutions, sees itself and is seen by others as a mediator 
among the interests of all four types-those of the competitive-
market type, the egalitarian type, and the atomized-individual type, 
36 I am indebted to the philosopher Hannah Arendt for these distinctions. See generally H. 
ARENDT, What is Authority?, in BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE 91-141 (1968). 
37 This point is similar to one made by H. L.A. Hart in his discussion of the internal view of 
law and the "rule of recognition" in H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 79-107 (1961). 
38 See, e.g., H. ARENDT, ON VIOLENCE (1970); R. NISBET, TWILIGHT OF AUTHORITY (1975). 
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as well as its own. The bureaucratic type is therefore distinguished 
from the others. Whereas this type is primarily committed to the 
concept of process and attempts, and is expected to attempt, to 
incorporate the others into its process or at least take their interests 
into account, the other three types are primarily interested in out-
comes and the effects of those outcomes on their own interests. 39 
The bureaucratic type is thus a focal point in the interactions of 
the four types. Through the legislative process, all four types give 
the bureaucratic type the responsibility and legal authority to me-
diate their interactions. They are especially likely to give this re-
sponsibility and authority in situations that require institutional 
management, such as risk management situations. 40 Nevertheless, 
political authority-authority that is backed by the consent of the 
governed-does not necessarily accompany legal authority. And 
without political authority, the bureaucratic group may (must?) then 
rely instead upon devices that are used by the group types conferring 
the legal authority. 
These devices may take the form of marketplace mechanisms or 
egalitarian consensus-seeking, and they all are rooted in a shifting 
blend of persuasion and coercion. For persuasion and coercion are 
the tools used by the other two powerful groups, the market and 
egalitarian groups, in their internal and external relationships. Per-
suasion is their first resort, but both may turn to coercion if persua-
sion fails.41 
When thinking about coercion and persuasion, a number of hard 
questions come to mind. What counts as coercion? What counts as 
persuasion? When does persuasion become coercion? The line be-
tween the two can be surprisingly thin. For example, it is difficult 
to say whether Chapter 21D's refusal to give potential host com-
munities the power to veto hazardous waste facilities was coercion. 
The potential host communities apparently thought that it was. It 
is also difficult to say whether the Act's requirement of a dialogue 
between facility developers and prospective host communities was a 
39 The egalitarian type and to a lesser extent the market type may also be concerned about 
the interests of atomized individuals, who are struggling simply to survive. 
10 See infra Section IV for a discussion of changing institutional approaches to chemically 
hazardous and radioactive waste management. 
11 Unlike the market group, the egalitarian group would use coercion only on outsiders, not 
on insiders, since coercion is antithetical to the egalitarian's strong preference for a like-
minded group. But, paradoxically, if a person is not like-minded and cannot be persuaded to 
agree, then he or she disqualifies themself as a member of the group and becomes a justifiable 
target for coercion. 
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form of persuasion. The communities thought that it was not, or that 
it was manipulative persuasion. 
When Chapter 21D was passed, the prohibition of local vetoes 
appeared to be a reasonable exercise of state power, and the require-
ment of local negotiations appeared to be suitable inducements to 
prompt communities to define their terms of acceptance. N everthe-
less, both the prohibition of local vetoes and the mandated negotia-
tions were received by the prospective host communities as an un-
palatable blend of coercion and persuasion. They had to accept the 
facility, and they had to negotiate an agreement. 
The prospective host communities' reactions to Chapter 21D sug-
gest that, paradoxically, market and egalitarian groups may regard 
the tools of coercion and persuasion suspiciously when they are 
wielded by a public agency, even though these groups continue to 
regard their own use of coercion and persuasion as legitimate. And 
to the extent that the market and egalitarian groups do regard 
suspiciously the bureaucratic group's use of these tools, they have 
another reason, beyond their innate suspicion of the bureaucratic 
type, to withdraw the political authority that they had vested in that 
type. In other words, they have yet another reason not to trust in 
and not to consent to bureaucratic processes. But, until legal au-
thority is withdrawn as well, the bureaucratic group's responsibili-
ties have not ended. 
The problem for bureaucracy, then, becomes one of how to regain 
trust and consent, reestablish political authority, and avoid exten-
sive-and perhaps futile-reliance on either persuasion or coercion 
as the main underpinnings of the bureaucratic process. The Low-
Level Radioactive Waste Management Act and the proposed amend-
ments to Chapter 21D are attempts to reverse the spiral away from 
political authority. It remains to be seen whether they will succeed. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Like the amendments to Chapter 21D proposed by Senator Amick, 
the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Act stresses bu-
reaucratic and egalitarian values over market values, but it does so 
more extensively and forcefully. There is a good historical reason 
for this difference. Traditionally, hazardous waste management has 
been a market-initiated, private responsibility, whereas in 1980, low-
level radioactive waste management became by law a public respon-
sibility. 
But the private responsibility/public responsibility distinction be-
tween hazardous chemical waste and low-level radioactive waste will 
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diminish with implementation of the "Superfund Amendments," 
which require states to begin taking responsibility for hazardous 
chemical waste generated within their borders.42 And, apart from 
legal distinctions, both public and governmental attitudes toward 
hazardous chemical waste have shifted. The public increasingly has 
expressed an interest in the safe management of hazardous chemical 
waste, and the states increasingly have assumed an initiatory rather 
than a solely regulatory role. 
In addition, with communities' objections to hosting hazardous 
waste facilities, states have begun to intervene. Consequently, haz-
ardous chemical waste, like radioactive waste, is beginning to be 
seen as a risk that requires public management. The more radical 
revisions to Chapter 21D proposed by Governor Dukakis reflect this 
shift. 
Does risk management by a public institution necessarily mean a 
strong appeal to bureaucratic principles? No. But the two Massa-
chusetts Acts discussed here suggest that appeals to bureaucratic 
principles may be adopted as a fall-back position if appeals made 
primarily to market and egalitarian principles don't work. By making 
the bureaucratic group more central to the siting process and by 
expanding that process to include related risk management concerns, 
an attempt is being made to reestablish (or establish for the first 
time) an elusive but crucial prerequisite for any risk management 
process: the political authority to implement process. 
4" Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 § 104(k), 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1982 
and Supp. IV 1986). 
